INC ransomware has become a dominant RaaS operation, claiming 830+ victims since August 2023 and benefiting from the decline of LockBit and BlackCat; it uses phishing (T1566), credential dumping (T1003), command-line execution (T1059), WMI persistence (T1047), and exfiltration over C2 (T1041) before encryption.
Organizations across sectors targeted by INC affiliates.
A streamlined, lucrative RaaS platform attracting displaced affiliates poses broad, escalating ransomware risk.
- Deliver phishing-aware training and enforce MFA.
- Hunt for credential dumping, suspicious command lines, and WMI abuse.
- Monitor for pre-encryption exfiltration.
- Maintain offline backups and segmentation.
Key Technical Findings
Dominant RaaS operation (INC ransomware).
Enterprises across multiple sectors.
Phishing (T1566).
Command-line interface execution (T1059).
Windows Management Instrumentation (T1047).
Not specified in the source material.
Not specified in the source material.
Credential dumping (T1003).
Facilitated by harvested credentials.
Exfiltration over C2 (T1041) before encryption.
High – encryption and double-extortion-style impact.
Technical Background
INC ransomware grew into a leading RaaS (830+ victims since August 2023), aided by the disruption of LockBit and BlackCat. Its chain: phishing (T1566) for access, command-line execution (T1059) of payloads, WMI persistence (T1047), credential dumping (T1003) for lateral movement, C2 communication, exfiltration over C2 (T1041) before encryption, and finally file encryption with ransom demands.
Defenses: phishing-aware training, MFA, detection of credential dumping/WMI abuse/suspicious command lines, pre-encryption exfiltration monitoring, offline backups, and segmentation.
Attack Chain Analysis
-
Initial Access
ActivityPhishing (T1566).
EvidenceSuspicious emails; unusual logins.
TelemetryEmail gateway, auth logs.
Detection opportunityFlag phishing and login anomalies.
-
Credential Access
ActivityCredential dumping (T1003).
EvidenceLSASS access.
TelemetrySysmon EID 10.
Detection opportunityDetect credential dumping.
-
Persistence
ActivityWMI persistence (T1047).
EvidenceWMI subscriptions/processes.
TelemetrySysmon EID 19-21, WMI logs.
Detection opportunityDetect WMI persistence.
-
Exfiltration
ActivityExfiltrate over C2 (T1041) before encryption.
EvidenceAnomalous outbound transfers.
TelemetryProxy/firewall.
Detection opportunityAlert on bulk egress.
Deep Technical Behavior Analysis
The defining behaviors are phishing-led access, credential dumping, WMI persistence, and pre-encryption exfiltration. The strongest defenses are credential-dumping and WMI detection, egress monitoring, offline backups, and segmentation.
Specific INC indicators are not fully specified in the source material and require validation.
Indicators of Compromise
Indicators of Behavior
Behavioral indicators to hunt for even when atomic IoCs are limited (Potential — validate against your baseline).
| Behavioral Indicator | Description | Data Source | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anomalous PowerShell execution | Encoded/obfuscated commands, download cradles, or unusual parent-child process lineage. | Sysmon EID 1, PowerShell 4104 | Potential |
| Suspicious child process lineage | Office or web/service processes spawning script hosts or shells. | Sysmon EID 1, EDR | Potential |
| Security log clearing | Event log cleared or audit policy changed to hinder visibility. | Windows Security 1102, 4719 | Potential |
| New service / scheduled task creation | Unexpected persistence via services or tasks. | Security 7045, 4698; Sysmon | Potential |
| Web shell-like activity | New/modified server-side scripts in writable web paths; anomalous POSTs. | Web access/error logs, FIM | Potential |
| Abnormal 403/404/500 patterns | Enumeration or exploitation attempts against endpoints. | Web server logs, WAF | Potential |
| Beaconing to rare destinations | Periodic outbound connections to newly-seen domains/IPs or direct-IP C2. | Proxy, firewall, DNS logs | Potential |
| Unusual DNS queries | High-entropy or rare domains; possible tunneling. | DNS resolver logs | Potential |
| Authentication anomalies | Spraying/stuffing, impossible travel, or MFA fatigue patterns. | IdP/VPN logs, Azure AD/Okta sign-ins | Potential |
Detection Engineering Guidance
Defensive detection logic (Potential — tune to your environment). No exploit code is included; logic is for hunting and alerting only.
title: LSASS Access
logsource: { product: windows }
detection:
selection:
TargetImage|endswith: '\lsass.exe'
GrantedAccess: ['0x1010','0x1410']
condition: selection
level: high
title: Suspicious Script Host Execution
logsource: { product: windows, category: process_creation }
detection:
selection:
Image|endswith: ['\powershell.exe','\wscript.exe','\cscript.exe']
CommandLine|contains: ['-enc','-nop','DownloadString','FromBase64String']
condition: selection
level: high
Recommended Log Sources
| Platform | Log Source | What to Look For | Priority |
|---|---|---|---|
| Windows | Security Event Log | Logon (4624/4625), service (7045), task (4698), log clear (1102) | High |
| Windows | Sysmon | Process creation (1), network (3), image load (7), LSASS access (10) | High |
| Windows | PowerShell Operational | Script block logging (4104), module logging | High |
| Endpoint | EDR / Defender telemetry | Process tree, persistence, tamper attempts | High |
| Web | Web server access logs | Anomalous POSTs, new endpoints, web-shell-like requests | High |
| Web | Web server error logs | Repeated 403/404/500 bursts on single endpoints | Medium |
| Identity | IdP / VPN logs | Impossible travel, spraying, MFA fatigue | High |
| Network | DNS resolver logs | Rare/high-entropy domains, tunneling | Medium |
| Network | Proxy / firewall logs | Beaconing, direct-IP C2, exfil volume | High |
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Tactic | Technique ID | Technique Name | Relevance | Detection Opportunity | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Access | T1566 | Phishing | Utilizes phishing emails to gain initial foothold in target environments. | Monitor for suspicious email patterns and unusual login attempts. | Reported |
| Credential Access | T1003 | Credential Dumping | Harvests credentials from compromised systems to facilitate lateral movement. | Analyze authentication logs for anomalies in user behavior. | Reported |
| Execution | T1059 | Command-Line Interface | Employs command-line tools to execute ransomware payloads stealthily. | Track process execution with Sysmon Event ID 1 for unusual command lines. | Reported |
| Exfiltration | T1041 | Exfiltration Over Command and Control Channel | Before encryption, sensitive data is exfiltrated to a C2 server. | Inspect network traffic for unusual outbound connections during high-risk times. | Reported |
Incident Response Guidance
- Validate exposure and confirm whether the issue applies to your environment.
- Preserve evidence (memory, disk, relevant logs) before remediation.
- Isolate affected hosts/accounts if compromise is suspected.
- Collect volatile data and review the log sources listed above.
- Hunt for the indicators of behavior and any related atomic indicators.
- Rotate potentially exposed credentials, keys, and session tokens.
- Remove persistence (tasks, services, keys, web shells, cron, OAuth grants).
- Patch affected systems; reimage where integrity cannot be assured.
- Run post-remediation validation and a BAS/security-validation retest.
Remediation and Hardening
- Patch affected systems and reduce internet-exposed services.
- Enforce MFA and least-privilege for privileged and remote access.
- Improve endpoint telemetry (Sysmon/EDR) and PowerShell logging.
- Restrict script execution and constrain LOLBins where feasible.
- Monitor persistence locations and disable unnecessary services.
- Segment critical assets and review privileged accounts.
- Rotate secrets and remove credentials from configuration files.
- Tune SIEM/EDR detections, then validate controls after changes.
Business Risk
- Service disruption: degraded or unavailable systems during compromise or recovery.
- Data exposure: risk to sensitive, regulated, or customer data depending on scope.
- Regulatory exposure: potential breach-notification and compliance obligations.
- Financial impact: incident response, downtime, and potential extortion costs.
- Brand and trust impact: reputational damage with customers and partners.
- Operational continuity: ransomware can halt critical business processes until restored.
- Identity blast radius: compromised accounts can expand access across cloud and SaaS.
Executive Takeaway
What leadership needs to know: A streamlined, lucrative RaaS platform attracting displaced affiliates poses broad, escalating ransomware risk. Current assessed risk: High.
Prioritise: patching/exposure reduction, identity hardening (MFA, least privilege), and detection coverage for the techniques above.
Validate after remediation: re-test controls with breach & attack simulation to confirm the relevant techniques are now prevented or detected.
Validating Your Defenses with Valitrix
The Valitrix Breach and Attack Simulation (BAS) platform provides an essential layer of protection by continuously validating security controls against real-world threats like INC ransomware. By simulating specific T1566 — Phishing, T1003 — Credential Dumping, and T1059 — Command-Line Interface techniques, organizations can identify potential weaknesses in their defenses before they are exploited by adversaries.
This proactive approach ensures that detection mechanisms are not only in place but are also effective in real-time scenarios. Through continuous testing and simulations, Valitrix empowers security teams to fortify their defenses against evolving threats such as INC ransomware.
Key Takeaways
- INC ransomware has rapidly evolved into a leading RaaS threat with over 830 victims reported since its inception.
- The group exploits disruptions in other RaaS operations to recruit affiliates effectively.
- Main tactics include phishing, credential dumping, command-line execution, and exfiltration over C2 channels.
- A proactive multi-layered security strategy is crucial for defending against such threats.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is INC ransomware?
INC ransomware is a rapidly growing Ransomware-as-a-Service operation that targets organizations globally, demanding ransoms in exchange for decryption keys.



